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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Petitioners-Appellants Benone Halinga and Petronela Halinga (collectively the 
"Halingas") appeal the district court's order denying the Hali11gas' motion to set aside 
default and default judgment. As explained more fully below, the district court properly 
exercised its discretion concluding the Halingas were properly served with process and 
that there was no basis for setting aside the default judgment. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings 
In August of 2010, Leroy Mickey ("Mr. Mickey") responded to an employment 
advertisement for someone with restaurant management experience. (R., p.6 
(Complaint, ,m 9-10).) As a result of his inquiry, Mr. Mickey met with and discussed 
helping the Halingas open a new restaurant and sports bar. (R., p.6 (Complaint, ,m 9-
10).) In exchange for Mr. Mickey's assistance, the Halingas promised Mr. Mickey 
employment and a 10% interest in the business, including an immediate ten percent 
(10%) interest in the profits. (R., pp.7-8 (Complaint, ,m 11-12).) Mr. Mickey worked 
tirelessly to establish the business. Among many things, Mr. Mickey negotiated a 
sublease, created a business plan, hired and trained staff, developed training materials, 
developed the menu, negotiated with vendors, and worked to secure permits and 
licenses from applicable government entities. (R., p.7 (Complaint, ,m 13-14).) Just prior 
to the opening of the business, Mr. Mickey was fired and separated from the business. 
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(R., p.7 (Complaint, 1116).) Notwithstanding his agreements, Mr. Mickey was not paid 
the wages he was owed, was not provided any portion of the profits, and was certainly 
not provided any interest in the ownership of the business. (R., p.9 (Complaint, 1111 31-
36).) 
On February 28, 2012, Mr. Mickey initiated the present legal action against the 
business, Benone Enterprises, Inc. and against Mr. and Mrs. Halinga individually, 
asserting claims for breach of contract and violation of Idaho's wage claim laws. (R., 
p.8 (Complaint, 1111 26-36).) After filing the Complaint, Mr. Mickey, through counsel, 
hired the services of Allied Process Servers, LLC to serve the pleadings and related 
summons on the Halingas and their business entity, Benone Enterprises, Inc. 
On February 29, 2012, Levi Holloway, a professional process server employed 
by Allied Process Servers, LLC served Mr. and Mrs. Halinga at the Halinga's residence 
in Boise, Idaho. (R., pp. 79-82 (Affidavits of Service, filed March 1, 2012, for Petronela 
Halinga, Benone Halinga and Benone Enterprises (referred to as "Petronela Affidavitof 
Service," "Benone Affidavit of Service" and "Benone Enterprises Affidavit of Service," 
attached to the April 24, 2012 Affidavit of Levi Holloway ("Holloway Aff.") as Exhibits A, 
B and C).) Mr. Holloway was at all times competent and qualified to serve process 
being over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the action or otherwise an 
interested party. (R., pp.75-76 (Holloway Aff., 11111, 3, and 4).) 
In preparing to serve the complaint and summons, Mr. Holloway asked for and 
was provided a detailed description of Mr. and Mrs. Halinga as well as a description of 
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the vehicles they drove. (R., p. 76 (Holloway Aff., ,r 4).) To be clear, this occurred 
before Mr. Holloway attempted to serve process. On February 29, 2012, at 
approximately 7:23 p.m., Mr. Holloway went to the Halinga residence located at 4369 N. 
Borrego Way, in Boise, Idaho. (R., p.76 (Holloway Aff., ,r 5).) Mr. Holloway observed a 
vehicle that had been described to him as one of the Halingas' vehicles. (R., p.76 
(Holloway Aff., ,r 6).) Mr. Holloway knocked on the door and was received by a woman 
dressed in a bath robe who identified herself as Petronela Halinga. (R., p. 76 (Holloway 
Aff., ,r 6).) 
After Mrs. Halinga accepted service on her own behalf and on behalf of her 
husband through substitute service, Mr. Holloway asked her if she could accept service 
on behalf of Benone Enterprises, Inc. (R., p.76 (Holloway Aff., ,r 7).) When Mrs. 
Halinga stated that she could, Mr. Holloway served Mrs. Halinga as an agent of Benone 
Enterprises, Inc. (R., p.76 (Holloway Aff., ,r 7).) Ultimately, it was determined that Mrs. 
Halinga was not authorized to accept service on behalf of Benone Enterprises, Inc. 
Accordingly, Mrs. Halinga was served by personal service and Mr. Halinga was 
served by substitute service through his wife at his personal residence. (R., pp. 79 and 
81 (Holloway Aff., Exhibits A & B).) At the same time Mrs. Halinga was served she also 
was hand-delivered a copy of the Plaintiff's First Set of Interrogatories, Requests for 
Admissions and Requests for Production of Documents. (R., p.18.) Significantly, notice 
of that discovery was filed with the district court the next day and, on March 1, 2012, a 
copy was sent to the Halingas' residence via U.S. standard mail. (R., p. 20.) 
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Notwithstanding the service and the fact that the Halingas also received notice of 
the lawsuit via the discovery papers mailed to their home, the Halingas failed to file an 
answer or otherwise respond. (R., pp.25-31.) Accordingly, hearing no response during 
the twenty-day time period, counsel for Mr. Mickey duly applied for entry of default and 
default judgment. Id. Based on the Halingas' failure to timely answer the pleading, the 
district court entered on March 23, 2012 a Default Judgment against the Halingas 
individually and against their corporate entity, Benone Enterprises, Inc. (R., pp.37-43.) 
On April 16, 2012, all of the named defendants, the Halingas and their business 
entity, filed a motion to set aside default and default judgment, including a supporting 
memorandum and affidavits from Mr. and Mrs. Halinga. (R., pp.44-48.) The basis of 
their motion to set aside the default and default judgment was Rule 55(c) and 60(b) of 
the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, the Halingas cited Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 60(b)(1) that provides that a trial court may relieve a party from a final 
judgment on the ground of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. (R., 
p.47.) The Halingas asserted only "excusable neglect" and claimed as their sole basis 
for that neglect that "the defendants were not properly served." (R., p.44.) In support of 
that argument, the Halingas submitted affidavits that "they were not served with, 
received a copy or made aware of the complaint .... " (R., p.46.) To be clear, they made 
no other argument related to "excusable neglect"--they only contended that Mrs. 
Haling a was not served. 
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The Halingas made this claim notwithstanding the sworn affidavit and affidavit of 
service executed by Mr. Holloway, the neutral third party process server, and the fact 
that the record affirmatively proved that the Halingas received notice of the lawsuit 
through discovery sent to their home via U.S. mail. (R., pp. 20, 21, 22, 79 and 81.) 
On May 3, 2012, the district court held a hearing on the Halingas' motion to set 
aside default. At that hearing, the Halingas relied exclusively on the affidavit of Mrs. 
Halinga wherein she claimed she was not served with the lawsuit. (May 3, 2012 H'ring 
Tr., p.9, Ls.9-16.) Mrs. Halinga did not take the witness stand. With regard to the 
business entity, Benone Enterprises, Inc., the Halingas argued for the first time that Mrs. 
Halinga was not an agent of Benone Enterprises, Inc. authorized to accept service on 
behalf of the business. (May 3, 2012 H'ring Tr., p.10, Ls.7-11.) Significantly, the 
Halingas spent very little time addressing the first part of the Rule 60(b) analysis--
whether there was excusable neglect--and instead focused almost entirely on whether 
there was a meritorious defense to the claims asserted in the pleading. (See generally, 
May 3, 2012 H'ring Tr., p.9, L.9 - p.13, L.9.)1 
1 The briefing made clear to the district court the applicable legal burden--that per Rule 
60(b)(1) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and relevant case law, a trial court could 
relieve a party from a final judgment on a finding of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect and where facts pied would constitute a defense to the action. (R., 
pp. 62-63 (citing Jonsson v. Oxborrow, 141 Idaho 635, 638, 115 P.3d 726, 729 (2005); 
Danz v. Lockhart, 132 Idaho 113, 114-15, 967 P.2d 1075, 1076-77 (Ct. App. 1998); 
Cuevas v. Barraza, 146 Idaho 511, 516, 198 P.3d 740, 745 (Ct. App. 2008); see also 
R., p. 47.) 
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In response to these arguments, Mr. Mickey identified the testimony of Mr. 
Holloway--the neutral and professional process server who was not a party to the action 
and that had been hired to effectuate service. Mr. Mickey asserted that Mr. Holloway 
was the more credible witness, highlighting the fact that Mr. Holloway had been 
provided descriptions before he served Mrs. Halinga and that the Halingas had actual 
notice of the lawsuit by alternative means, including mailings sent to the Halingas' 
home. (See generally May 3, 2012 H'ring Tr., p.13, L.13 p.14, L.24.) Mr. Mickey also 
argued that before the district court evaluates whether there is a meritorious defense it 
must first establish excusable neglect for each individual defendant and that under the 
present circumstances there was no excusable neglect. (May 3, 2012 H'ring Tr., p.15, 
Ls.2-6.) 
The district court recognized the Rule 60(b) threshold analysis began with a 
credibility determination on who was telling the truth about being served. (May 3, 2012 
H'ring Tr., p.1, Ls.2-6.) The district court considered the testimony of both Mrs. Halinga 
and Mr. Holloway, noting that Mr. Holloway was not an interested party like Mrs. 
Halinga, and, therefore, did not have the same motivation to be untruthful: 
[T]here is certainly a motive to fabricate by Ms. Halinga and quite 
frankly a very compelling motive not to fabricate by the process 
server. Okay? 
The issue before the court initially is whether or not the 
moving party has carried his burden of proof and burden of 
persuasion on that very crucial issue, and I find, Mr. Kulchack, that 
you have not. I find rather that it is more probable than not that the 
process server's version of the events and his sworn affidavit 
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swearing that he did serve Ms. Halinga at that location is more 
probable than not the truth. 
So that's my first finding. 
(May 3, 2012 H'ririg Tr., p.19, L.3 - p.21, L.2.).) Having made the finding that Mrs. 
Halinga had been served at her home on February 29, 2012, the district court then 
concluded that Mrs. Halinga and her husband, who also resided at the home, had been 
properly served. 
I appreciate the fact the result is somewhat harsh when it comes to 
Mr. and Mrs. Halinga, but having found that she was served and 
therefore he was also served, and he is not claiming that he wasn't 
a--that this home was not his usual place of abode, I find that I'm 
not going to set aside the default. 
(May 3, 2012 H'ring Tr., p.26, Ls.3-10.) Consequently, the district court concluded that 
there was no "excusable neglect" as to Mr. or Mrs. Halingas' failure to answer the 
Complaint. Accordingly, the district court held: 
Although there was very possibly neglect in this case, the court 
does not find that neglect was excusable, because Mrs. Halinga 
was properly served and her husband was properly served through 
her. Any failure to call it to his attention might have been neglect, 
but it wasn't excusable negligent, at least based on the documents 
in the file. That's going to be the order of the court. 
(May 3, 2012 H'ring Tr., p.27, L.25 - p.28, L.8.). The district court did agree with 
the Halingas' argument that Mrs. Haliriga was not an authorized agent of Benone 
Enterprises, Inc. and, therefore, that service was not properly effectuated as to 
Benone Enterprises, Inc. Accordingly, the district court granted the motion to set 
aside as to the business entity: 
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The default and default judgment is set aside with respect to 
the corporate entity, because the individual who was served was 
not authorized to accept service on behalf of the corporation. 
The default and default judgment entered against the 
individual defendants, Mr. and Mrs. Halinga, is not set aside. 
Service was properly effected upon Mrs. Halinga and Mr. Halinga at 
7:23 p.m. on the date indicated and the court so finds. 
(May 3, 2012 H'ring Tr., p.26, L.24 - p.27, L.9; R., p.136.) 
On May 21, 2012, the Halingas appealed. They identify three issues on appeal 
set forth below: 
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ISSUES 
The Halingas state the issues on appeal as: 
A. Whether the Appellants' failure to timely answer the complaint was the 
product of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect and 
therefore should be set aside pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure. 
B. Whether the judgment against the Appellants was void for lack of 
service and should be set aside pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4). 
C. Whether the default judgment should be set aside pursuant to Rule 
60(b)(6) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure on the grounds the 
judgment against the corporation was set aside and the liability of the 
Appellants was based upon the theory that the corporation was their 
alter ego and unless the corporation is found liable there can be no 
basis for piercing the corporate vale [sic]. 
(Appellants' Brief, p.3.) 
Mr. Mickey restates the issues on appeal as follows: 
I. Have the Halingas failed to establish that the district court's 
determination that the Halingas were served process and that the 
default judgment against them should not be set aside was based 
upon clearly erroneous factual determinations and an abuse of the 
district court's broad discretion to deny motions to set aside default 
judgments? 
II. Is Mr. Mickey entitled to fees on appeal where the Halingas' case is 





The District Court Properly Exercised Its Discretion Denying The Halingas' 
Motion To Set Aside The Default Judgment Where The Court's Findings Were Not 
Clearly Erroneous And Logically Applied To Support The District Court's Legal 
Conclusions. 
A. Introduction 
The Halingas argue the district court erred in not granting their motion to set 
aside the default judgment that had been entered against them individually. In support 
of their request the Halingas make three arguments--each without legal merit. First, the 
Halingas argue the district court mistakenly concluded there was no excusable neglect. 
(Appellants' Brief, p.5.) Next, the Halingas claim the judgment should be set aside 
apparently on the basis that the judgment obtained was "void" because they maintain 
that the Halingas were never served--in essence a second attempt to argue there was 
excusable neglect. (Appellants' Brief, p.7). Third, the Halingas argue the district court 
erred in not granting the motion to set aside claiming "[t]he liability of the [Halingas] is 
based entirely upon the allegation that Benone Enterprises, Inc. is [the Halingas] alter 
ego." (Appellants' Brief, pp.7-8). It appears that this argument is an attempt to argue 
that regardless of excusable neglect, the district court should have exercised its 
discretion in setting aside the judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
These three arguments are not persuasive. Notwithstanding the Halingas' 
creative attempts to create multiple and complicated issues, the issue is simple and 
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straightforward. A district court has broad discretion in determining whether to set aside 
a default judgment. Absent a showing that the district court's factual findings are clearly 
erroneous and that the district court abused its discretion, the district court's refusal to 
set aside a default judgment is upheld. Here, the district court made a factual 
determination that Mrs. Halinga was personally served at the time and place where the 
neutral and uninterested process server said he served her. Accordingly, the district 
court concluded that both Mr. and Mrs. Halinga were duly and properly served process 
and there was no excusable neglect. The district court's factual finding was not "clearly 
erroneous" but supported by facts in the record. Any claim of excusable neglect or that 
the judgment was void because service was not effectuated is without basis. As to the 
remaining argument that separate and apart from having to show excusable neglect the 
default judgment should be set aside because somehow the claims were only valid as 
against the corporate defendant and not against the Halingas as individual defendants--
this is an issue that has not been preserved and is, therefore, not properly before this 
appellate court. Even if it were, the argument lacks legal and factual merit. The 
pleadings affirmatively establish liability on the part of both the individual defendants 
and the corporate defendant. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) authorizes a trial court to relieve a party 
from a final judgment for the reason of "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect." A decision whether to grant a motion under I.R.C.P. 60(b) is committed to the 
11 
sound discretion of the trial court. See Shelton v. Diamond Int'/ Corp., 108 Idaho 935, 
937, 703 P.2d 699, 701 (1985); Sherwood & Roberts, Inc. v. Riplinger, 103 Idaho 535, 
541, 650 P.2d 677, 683 (1982). Absent an abuse of that discretion, an appellate court 
will not overturn the trial court's decision. See Catledge v. Transp. Tire Co., 107 Idaho 
602, 607, 691 P.2d 1217, 122 (1984). The trial court will be considered to have acted 
within its sound discretion on a motion to set aside a default judgment if: 
(a) the trial court makes findings of fact which are not clearly erroneous, 
(b) the court applies to those facts the proper criteria under Rule 60(b)(1) 
(tempered by the policy favoring relief in doubtful cases), and (c) the trial 
court's decision follows logically from application of such criteria to the 
facts found, then the court will be deemed to have acted within its sound 
discretion. Its decision will not be overturned on appeal. 
Shelton, 108 Idaho at 938, 703 P.2d at 702. Here, as explained below, the district 
court's decision was not an abuse of discretion. The district court made factual findings 
supported by the facts in the record and logically applied those facts to the proper legal 
framework and criteria. In short, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
the Halingas' motion to set aside. 
C. The District Court's Determination That There Was No Excusable Neglect Was 
Based On Substantial And Competent Evidence And Not An Abuse Of Discretion 
The Halingas argued to the district court that the default judgment should be set 
aside because of excusable neglect. The district court rejected that argument. The 
Halingas now claim that the district court's determination was in error and an abuse of 
discretion. (Appellants' Brief, p.5.) 
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The sole basis for the claim of excusable neglect to the district court was the 
Halingas' assertion that they were not served with the Summons and Complaint: 
Come now Defendants, by and through undersigned counsel, and move 
this court pursuant to 55(c) and 60(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure for and [sic) order setting aside the Order of Default and 
Default Judgment entered by this court on March 23, 2012 on the grounds 
that the defendants were not properly setved and by excusable neglect 
failed to respond to the complaint. 
(R., p.44 (Emphasis added.).) In support of this claim, the Halingas submitted an 
affidavit from Mrs. Halinga wherein she claimed she "was never served with, receive 
[sic] a copy or was aware of the summons and complaint" and that she "was not aware 
that a lawsuit had been filed against me, my husband Benone or his corporation ... " (R., 
p.54.)2 There was no other asserted basis for excusable neglect. 
In response to Mrs. Halinga's affidavit and the claim of excusable neglect, Mr. 
Mickey proffered the affidavit of Levi Holloway, the process server employed by Allied 
Process Servers, LLC, to serve Mrs. Halinga. (R., pp. 75-78.) Mr. Holloway affirmed 
he was a neutral and detached third-party with no interest in the outcome of the case. 
(R., p.76.) He provided sworn affidavit testimony that prior to attempting to serve the 
Halingas he was provided a physical description of the Halingas as well as their 
vehicles. (R., p.76.) Mr. Holloway further confirmed that on February 29, 2012 he went 
to the Halingas' residence, observed one of the vehicles described, knocked on the 
door and spoke with a woman who said she was Petronela Halinga. (R., p.76.) He 
2 Although Mrs. Halinga attended the hearing on the motion to set aside the default 
judgment, she was not called on to testify further and did not take the witness stand. 
(May 3, 2012 H'ring Tr., p.8, Ls.4-20.) 
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further stated that Ms. Halinga accepted service and that later, when shown a picture of 
Mrs. Halinga, was able to confirm the fact that she, Mrs. Halinga, was in fact the 
individual that Mr. Holloway served. (R., pp.77-78.) 
The district court considered the testimony of both Mrs. Halinga and Mr. 
Holloway, noting that Mr. Holloway was not an interested party like Mrs. Halinga, and, 
therefore, did not have the same motivation to be untruthful: 
Here is how I'm going to come down on this. It is such a key to 
this whole case to determine whether or not Ms. Halinga had actually 
been served. On the one hand, I have a sworn affidavit from a process 
server who clearly knows under penalty of perjury he is not to ever file an 
affidavit that is false when it comes to service of his process. That's 
livelihood, after all. And, with no information to the contrary and no other 
reason to question any motive that he might have, his affidavit seems 
credible on its face. 
On the other hand, I have Ms. Halinga who does have a motive to 
misremember, but nevertheless, she doesn't simply claim that she wasn't 
served. 
And, there is certainly a motive to fabricate by Ms. Halinga and 
quite frankly a very compelling motive not to fabricate by the process 
server. Okay? 
The issue before the court initially is whether or not the moving 
party has carried his burden of proof and burden of persuasjon on that 
very crucial issue, and I find, Mr. Kulchack, that you have not. I find rather 
that it is more probably than not that the process server's version of the 
events and his sworn affidavit swearing that he did serve Ms. Halinga at 
that location is more probable than not the truth. 
So that's my first finding. 
(May 3, 2012 H'ring Tr., p.19, L.3 - p.21, L.2.).) 
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In light of this finding, that Mrs. Halinga had been served at her home on 
February 29, 2012, the district court then concluded that Mrs. Halinga and her husband, 
who also resided at the home, had been properly served: 
I appreciate the fact the result is somewhat harsh when it comes to Mr. 
and Mrs. Halinga, but having found that she was served and therefore he 
was also served, and he is not claiming that he wasn't a - that this home 
was not his usual place of abode, I find that I'm not going to set aside the 
default. 
(May 3, 2012 H'ring Tr., p.26, Ls.3-10.) Accordingly, as indicated above, the district 
court properly exercised its discretion and concluded that there was no "excusable 
neglect" as to the Halingas' failure to answer the Complaint: 
Although there was very possibly neglect in this case, the court does not 
find that neglect was excusable, because Mrs. Halinga was properly 
served and her husband was properly served through her. Any failure to 
call it to his attention might have been neglect, but it wasn't excusable 
negligent, at least based on the documents in the file. That's going to be 
the order of the court. 
(May 3, 2012 H'ring Tr., p.27, L.25 - p.28, L.8.) 
On appeal, the Halingas attack the district court's legal holdings and factual 
findings claiming that "[t]he trial court's reasoning in determining the [sic] there was no 
excusable neglect was based upon its assumption that it was more probable than not 
that Petronela was not telling the truth in her affidavit ... " Appellant's Brief, p.5. 
Regardless of how the Halingas frame their claim that the district court got it wrong on 
excusable neglect, the Halingas' must show that the district court's factual finding, that 
Mrs. Halinga was served, was clearly erroneous. 
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In deciding whether findings of fact are clearly erroneous, Idaho's appellate 
courts determine whether the findings are supported by substantial, competent 
evidence. In re Williamson v. City of McCall, 135 Idaho 452, 454, 19 P.3d 766, 768 
(2001 ). Evidence is substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely on it. 
Id. "Findings based on substantial, competent evidence, although conflicting, will not be 
disturbed on appeal." Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792, 53 P.3d 1211, 1213 (2002) 
(Emphasis added.). Here, there can be no real dispute that substantial and competent 
evidence supports the district court's finding that Mrs. Halinga was served. The 
evidence provided by Mr. Holoway's affidavit certainly provides that basis. At best, the 
Halingas' can only identify in the record evidence that would be considered "conflicting 
evidence." Conflicting evidence, however, is insufficient to establish a factual finding as 
clearly erroneous. Id. Thus, here, where the Halingas argue the district court erred in 
not granting relief pursuant to excusable neglect, the argument necessarily fails 
because the underlying factual determination--whether Mrs. Halinga was served--is not 
clearly erroneous. There is no other basis for excusable neglect and, therefore, no other 
basis on appeal for asserting error. 
D. The Halingas' Claim That The Judgment Was Void Is Redundant And Not A 
Proper Argument On Appeal. 
The Halingas' second argument does not appear to be a proper argument on 
appeal as it fails to identify district court error and to the extent that it raises new issues 
those issues were not raised below and should not be considered on appeal. The 
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Halingas' brief asserts that "Rule 60(b)(4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, a 
default judgment may be set aside when that judgment is found to be void." Appellants' 
Brief, p.7. They then argue that "Benone [Halinga] was in Alaska at the time of the 
alleged service and Petronela [Halinga] was at her salon"--in essence the same 
argument that was made to the district court below. The Halingas also appear to raise a 
new argument, that the judgment was "void" and that the service of process was not 
proper because the Halingas claim the process server did not say in his affidavit 
whether he asked Mrs. Halinga for identification at the time he served her. (Appellants' 
Brief, p.7.) 
These arguments are improper and without basis for multiple reasons. First, they 
fail to identify district court error. Further, to the extent the Halingas are attempting to 
attack the district court's factual finding that Mrs. Halinga was actually served, they have 
failed to show that the district court's finding was "clearly erroneous." Consequently, 
any claim for reversal on that basis is unpersuasive. Also, the Halingas' factual 
allegations supporting their claim that the process server "had no idea what Petronela 
[Halinga] looked like" is false. The affidavit of Mr. Holloway made clear that he received 
a physical description of Mr. and Mrs. Halinga before he served process, as well as a 
description of their vehicles. (R., p.76.) The claim regarding Mrs. Halinga's 
identification is also misleading. Mr. Holloway attests that the person he served 
identified herself as Petronela Halinga. (R., p.76.) There is no support that Mrs. 
Halinga was not properly identified. 
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To the extent the Halingas are attempting to assert a new basis for excusable 
neglect--that the judgment was "void" under 60(b)(4) or that the process server should 
have asked for identification--these are arguments and issues not raised below and 
should not be considered. See State v. Corwin, 147 Idaho 893, 899, 216 P.3d 651, 657 
(Ct. App. 2009) ("Issues not raised below may not be considered for the first time on 
appeal.") (citing State v. Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992)). 
Clearly, Rule 60(b)(4) does not speak to excusable neglect. If anything, Appellants' 
Brief seems to rehash the failure to properly serve. In sum, the Halingas' second 
argument does not provide a substantive or legal basis for relief. 
E. The Halingas' New Argument That There Are Unique Circumstances That Justify 
Relief Under Rule 60(b)(6) Was Not Raised Below And, Even If It Was Raised 
Below, Lacks Merit. 
The Halingas' third argument on appeal is that because Rule 60(b)(6) states that 
a trial court may relieve a party from a final judgment for "any ... reason justifying relief 
from the operation of the judgment" that the district court apparently erred in not 
recognizing the "unique and compelling circumstances justifying relief." See Appellants' 
Brief, p.8. The Halingas then claim that those "unique and compelling circumstances" 
are present here because "[t]he liability of the Appellants is based entirely upon the 
allegation that Benone Enterprises, Inc. is their [meaning the individual defendants] alter 
ego." See Appellants' Brief, p.8. 
This argument lacks merit in law and fact. Again, as a threshold matter, this 
argument was not raised below and is, therefore, not properly presented on appeal. 
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The Halingas' motion to set aside and supporting briefing does not identify Rule 60(b)(6) 
as a basis for relief and they never asserted that there were unique and compelling 
circumstances unrelated to excusable neglect that justify the relief requested. Indeed, 
the motion states with unequivocal clarity that the grounds for setting aside default 
judgment was excusable neglect on their factual claim that Mrs. Halinga was not 
served. (R., p.44 ("Come now Defendants ... move this court pursuant to 55(c) and 60(b) 
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure for and [sic] order setting aside the Order of 
Default and Default Judgment entered by this court on March 23, 2012 on the grounds 
that the defendants were not properly served and by excusable neglect failed to 
respond to the complaint.") (Emphasis added.)) And, indeed, the district court ruled on 
that basis. No argument was made under subpart (6) or that there were "unique" and 
"compelling" reasons that justified relief separate and apart from the claimed excusable 
neglect. The Halingas' request for relief was "that the defendants were not properly 
served and by excusable neglect failed to respond to the complaint." (R., p.44.) 
Accordingly, the Halingas have not and cannot identify an erroneous factual 
determination or an incorrect application of law as the issue was simply not presented to 
the lower court. Stated differently, it is impossible to determine whether there was an 
abuse of discretion because there was never an opportunity to exercise that discretion. 
As cited above, issues not raised below may not be considered for the first time on 
appeal. See Corwin, 147 Idaho at 899, 216 P.3d at 657. Because the issue was not 
raised below, it should not be considered. 
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· Moreover, even if the Rule 60(b)(6) argument was somehow raised and ruled on 
below, it was certainly not an abuse of discretion (or more accurately would not have 
been an abuse of discretion) to deny the requested relief. In addition to being 
procedurally precluded, the argument that this case is unique in that "the liability of the 
Appellants [the Halingas] is based solely on the ability of the Respondent [Mr. Mickey] 
to pierce the corporate veil ... " is substantively false. 3 The Complaint clearly shows a 
basis for individual liability separate and apart from the claims asserted against the 
corporate defendant Benone Enterprises, Inc. Indeed, Mr. Mickey's breach of contract 
claim identifies all the named defendants as parties to the contract that was claimed to 
be breached, including Mr. and Mrs. Halinga as individuals. That contract included the 
agreement that Mr. and Mrs. Halinga would transfer ten percent (10%) of the business 
(meaning Benone Enterprises, Inc.) to Mr. Mickey as well as the employment 
agreement. Consequently, the assertion that there are no claims related to personal 
liability is simply false. 
3 The Halingas did make an argument related to "alter ego" at the hearing on the motion 
to set aside default. However, those arguments were made in the context of Rule 
60(b)(1) and "excusable neglect." In order to be granted relief under Rule 60(b)(1) a 
movant must show mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect and a 
meritorious defense. See Cuevas v. Barraza, 146 Idaho 511, 516, 198 P.3d 740, 745 
(Ct. App. 2008). To meet the "meritorious defense" requequiremet of the analysis, the 
Halingas argued as a "defense" that the claims asserted against them individually 
lacked merit because the contract was actually betrween Mr. Mickey and the Halingas' 
closely held business entity, Benone Enterprises, Inc. And, they asserted there was no 
basis for claiming alter ego. 
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In short, there can be no doubt that the grounds for the Halingas' motion to set 
aside were that they were not served and that their failure to respond to the complaint 
constituted excusable neglect. The district court made a factual finding that the 
Halingas' were served and the record uncontrovertibly shows that there is substantial 
and competent evidence supporting that finding. Accordingly, the district court's order 
denying the Halingas' motion to set aside was not an abuse of discretion and should be 
affirmed on appeal. 
11. 
Attorney Fees And Costs Of Appeal Should Be Awarded To Mr. Mickey. 
Mr. Mickey asserts he is entitled to fees and costs incurred in defending this 
appeal. Mr. Mickey claims he is entitled to fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121 and 
Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2. 
Idaho appellate courts have made clear that "attorney fees on appeal are 
awarded under [Idaho Code § 12-121] when the Court is left with an abiding belief that 
the appeal was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without 
foundation." See Bailey v. Bailey, 153 Idaho 526, 284 P.3d 970, 976 (2012) (quoting 
Schmechel v. Dille, 148 Idaho 176,188,219 P.3d 1192, 1204 (2009)); see also Bums v. 
Baldwin, 138 Idaho 480, 487, 65 P.3d 502, 509 (2003)). Rule 11.2 of the Idaho 
Appellate Rules permits the appellate court to fix an appropriate sanction, including an 
award of fees, where an appellate brief is not well-grounded in fact or warranted by 
existing law or good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing 
21 
law. See Idaho Appellate Rule 11.2. A party seeking fees on appeal must "support the 
claim with argument as well as authority." Evans v. Sayler, 151 Idaho 223, 228, 254 
P.3d 1219, 1224 (2011) (citing Crump v. Bromley, 148 Idaho 172,176,219 P.3d 1188, 
1192 (2009)). 
Here, Mr. Mickey is entitled to fees per Idaho Code § 12-121 and Rule 11.2 
because the arguments presented on appeal are frivolous and unreasonable and not 
grounded in fact or law in light of Idaho's well established law regarding what a party 
must show to overturn a district court's order denying a motion to set aside default. 
There is no basis for claiming the district court's factual findings were clearly erroneous, 
nor any other grounds for asserting the district court committed an abuse of discretion in 
denying the motion. The remaining issues the Halingas present on appeal are improper 
and frivolous because they were not raised below. See Indian Springs L.L. C. v. 
Anderson, --- P.3d ----, 2012 WL 4055340 *7 (Idaho September 14, 2012) (granting fees 
where appeal was brought without foundation, including issues not raised below). 
In addition to claiming fees, Mr. Mickey also claims that, pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rule 40, he should be awarded his costs of appeal as a matter of right should 
he be found to be the prevailing party. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Mickey respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's order 
denying the Halingas' motion to set aside default and default judgment. 
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DATED this 31 st day of October, 2012. 
BELNAP STEWART TAYLOR & IVlORRIS PLLC 
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KULCHAK & ASSOCIATES 
Michael Kulchak, Esq. 
2627 W. Idaho 
Post Office Box 63 7 
Boise, ID 83701-0637 
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